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Abstract 
Automated precise guided missile defence has been around for some 
years, and is a modern-day mechanism used frequently since 2011 to defend 
against rocket attacks penetrating national airspace. Israel’s automated Iron Dome 
Missile Defence System has intercepted over 1 000 rockets during two recent 
military campaigns, namely Operation Pillar of Defence in 2012 and Operation 
Protective Edge in 2014. This ‘human-in-the-loop’ technology may become 
increasingly normal in urbanised cities as states look to strengthen their aerial 
defence capabilities. However, the deployment of advanced sensor-based 
technology on the battlefield was predicted by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) in its 1987 Commentary to Additional Protocol I to bring about 
potentially disastrous consequences. Numerous roboticists, lawyers, and scientists 
have expressed concern, calling for a ban on similar fully autonomous weapon 
systems. There is no definitive answer yet as to the legality of actively deploying 
such a weapon system against rocket attacks. This article considers individual 
technological design choices made by Iron Dome’s manufacturer Rafael Advanced 
Defence Systems (Rafael) and explains trends as military efficiency is enhanced 
and legal provisions appear to be honoured 
within separate elements of the weapon 
system. Assessing the legalities and 
efficiencies of Iron Dome could inform 
future missile defence systems like Denel’s 
Cheetah Skyshield. 1 
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Legal problems behind contemporary land-based missile defence systems 
It is thirty years since the comprehensive prediction by the ICRC in the 
1987 Commentary to Additional Protocol I that if mankind does not master 
technology but rather allows the technology of future arms to master him, then the 
consequences thereof will be that mankind will be destroyed by technology.2 The 
South African National Defence Force (SANDF) already carries the pain of this 
harrowing commentary prediction. Nine local soldiers were killed by a 
computerised Swiss/German Oerlikon anti-aircraft weapon system during a live 
fire exercise at the Army Combat Training Centre at Lohatla in the Northern Cape 
in October 2007.3 According to a local press release, this malfunction occurred 
during the SANDF’s Exercise Seboka, which is an annual conventional military 
exercise involving 5 000 soldiers from 18 army units as well as members of the SA 
Air Force, SA Navy and SA Military Health Service.4 Against this prediction of 
doom and failure arising from automation, similar weapon systems are being 
produced by international aerospace manufacturers with the most high-profile of its 
kind being Rafael’s Iron Dome Missile Defence System, which has been stationed 
successfully to defend civilian cities from threatening rocket attacks. In a 2013 
article, Yiftah Shapir from the Israel Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) 
noted that a contemporary land-based missile defence system is a weapon system 
with no like-for-like competitor. According to Shapir, the only other weapon 
system in the world designed to shoot down short-range rockets and mortars is the 
American army’s Centurion weapon system, which is based on the naval Phalanx 
system.5 This article refers to Iron Dome as ‘a contemporary land-based missile 
defence system’. This general terminology acknowledges the unique technological 
advances of the weapon system, yet strips away its mystique by terming it as a 
common noun for possible future production by the arms manufacturers of 
different states. This terminology also excludes a 2016 update as the Israeli Navy 
                                                                                                                           
both military efficiency and legality by States using, or intending to use, such 
systems”. available at https://www.gov.za/speeches/statement-1st-international-
conference-military-law-south-africa-4-nov-2016-0000  
2 ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949 (1987) at 1476.  
3 Hosken, G, Schmidt, M & Du Plessis, J ‘9 Killed In Army Horror’ IOL (13 October 2007), 
available at https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/9-killed-in-army-horror-374838.  
4 Ibid.  
5 Shapir, Y ‘Lessons from the Iron Dome’ (2013) 5 Military and Strategic Affairs at 84.  
107 
successfully installed an Iron Dome battery onto a moving naval vessel termed a C-
Dome.6  
Daphne Richemond-Barak and Ayal Feinberg noted in a 2016 article the 
questions pertaining to the legality of deploying contemporary land-based missile 
defence systems in civilian environments.7 The Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative Public Law and International Law touched on this legal problem on 
an online portal on the Israel–Gaza Wars from 2008 to 2014, which it termed a 
“Debate Map”.8 Francis Grimal noted in a 2014 article on issues of the jus ad 
bellum for proposed theories of automated and anticipatory self-defence, that 
discussions on missile defence systems, such as Iron Dome and Patriot, are limited 
for two naive reasons. Either the lawfulness of an inherently defensive system is 
taken as a given or the strategic implications of rocket interceptions outweigh 
general concerns over the legality of the weapon system.9  
One example in the category of general concern was the angry protests and 
clashes with the police force in South Korea (Republic of Korea [ROK]) in 2017 
against the deployment of Lockheed Martin’s American-built THAAD (Terminal 
High-Altitude Area Defence) missile defence system batteries in the town of 
Seongju in North Gyeongsang Province. These protests occurred despite the 
THAAD weapon system being a defensive missile shield against escalating 
tensions and live ballistic missile tests being undertaken by its direct neighbour 
North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [DPRK])10. Protestors in the 
ROK raised their rights to peaceful life, health, a healthy environment and freedom 
of occupation to argue that the deployment of THAAD would be 
unconstitutional.11 This protest action furthermore raised environmental, noise and 
electromagnetic radiation concerns against the THAAD weapon system and argued 
                                                          
6 Israeli Navy ‘First Arm of the Sea: The Successful Interception of the Iron Dome Rocket Ship 
at Sea’ (Translated) (18 May 2016), available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OMjOP1jHiSI. 
7 Richemond-Barak, R & Feinberg, A ‘The Irony of The Iron Dome: Intelligent Defence 
Systems, Law and Security’ (2016) 7 (2) Harvard National Security Journal at 472.  
8 Oxford Public International Law ‘Mapping the Debate with Oxford Public International Law 
Israel-Gaza Wars 2008–2014’ (13 November 2014), available at 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/page/israel-gaza-debate-map.  
9 Grimal, F ‘Missile Defence Shields: Automated and Anticipatory Self Defence?’ (2014) 19 
(2) Journal of Conflict and Security Law at 318.  
10 Hincks, J ‘South Koreans Protest US Missile Installation as Tensions Escalate on the 
Peninsula’ TIME (26 April 2017), available at http://time.com/4755310/south-korea-
protest-thaad-missile/  
11 ‘South Koreans Appeal to Court, Say THAAD is Unconstitutional’ Sputnik News (7 April 
2017), available at https://sputniknews.com/asia/201704071052380181-south-
koreans-say-thaad-unconstitutional/. 
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in favour of a large-scale 12- to 15-month strategic environmental assessment to be 
concluded on the weapon system prior to deployment.12 These protests imply that a 
societal burden is arguably placed on civilians when stationing a potentially unsafe 
yet key military objective, like a contemporary land-based missile defence system, 
covertly or, in this case, overtly in or near a civilian environment. 
Further to these public protests there have been other views expressed. 
Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk and hundreds of other scientists and technologists 
signed a Future of Life declaration against Killer Robots. The ICRC published a 
number of expert meeting reports on autonomous weapon systems in 2014 and 
2016 to clarify their legal views on this complex subject matter further. Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) weighed in on the topic of autonomous weapon systems and 
reported, “the debate about fully autonomous weapons has continued to intensify 
since the issue reached the international stage four years ago”. They further stated, 
“lawyers, ethicists, military personnel, human rights advocates, scientists, and 
diplomats have argued, in a range of venues, about the legality and desirability of 
weapons that would select and engage targets without meaningful human control 
over individual attacks” and “divergent views remain as military technology moves 
toward ever greater autonomy, but there are mounting expressions of concern 
about how these weapons could revolutionize warfare as we know it”. According 
to HRW, they wish to “inform and advance this debate by further elaborating on 
the dangers of fully autonomous weapons and making the case for a pre-emptive 
ban”.13 Accordingly, the first chapter of their report “elaborates on the legal and 
non-legal dangers posed by fully autonomous weapons”.14 They state, “the 
weapons would face significant obstacles to complying with international 
humanitarian and human rights law and would create a gap in accountability” and 
“the prospect of weapons that could make life-and-death decisions generates moral 
outrage, and even the expected military advantages of the weapons could create 
unjustifiable risks.”15 The report is said to “make the case for a pre-emptive 
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News (10 August 2017), available at 
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delays/.  
13 Human Rights Watch ‘Making the Case: The Dangers of Killer Robots and the Need for a 
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prohibition on the development, production, and use of fully autonomous 
weapons”.16 Accordingly – 
[O]f the many alternatives proposed, only an absolute ban could effectively 
address all the concerns laid out in the first chapter. The ban should 
accordingly be adopted as soon as possible, before this revolutionary and 
dangerous technology enters military arsenals. Precedent from past 
disarmament negotiations and instruments shows that the prohibition is 
achievable and would be effective.17 
The real-life example of protests in the Korean Peninsula coupled with the 
debate in academic literature generates a modern-day problem statement of 
whether or not it is legal to deploy a contemporary land-based missile defence 
system in or near a civilian environment. This problem statement requires a 
comprehensive solution on the legal rationale underpinning the deployment of such 
a weapon system. Following this introductory discussion of the legal problem to be 
investigated, it is necessary to provide an overview of the functionality of a 
contemporary land-based missile defence system, Iron Dome, which is done in the 
next section. Following that, evidence of an existing international military law 
framework is provided, which can justify the use of contemporary land-based 
missile defence systems even when deployed within civilian environments 
generally.  
Functionality overview of contemporary land-based missile defence systems 
A contemporary land-based missile defence system is a mobile yet 
statically stationed weapon system. According to Shapir, Iron Dome is a regional 
weapon system, which is a land-based missile defence system deployed to defend 
an area of 100 km squared.18 This weapon system provides dual VSHORAD (very 
short range air defence) as well as C-RAM (counter rockets, artilleries and mortars) 
capability, and was designed by Israeli companies Rafael, Elta Systems and mPrest 
to shield civilian populations from unpredictable rocket attacks with ranges of up 
to 70 km.19 Each battery consists of Elta Systems’ radar, mPrest’s control and 
command centre housing computer servers, and Rafael’s armed automated 
platform or so-called ‘missile firing unit’ housing up to twenty missiles.20 Shapir 
claims that the weapon system has a confidential unpublished rocket saturation 
                                                          
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Shapir op cit 86. 
19 Shapir op cit 81. 
20 Ibid. 
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point at which it becomes overwhelmed by a finite number of rockets and can no 
longer respond.21 The land-based missile defence system is managed by humans; 
however, due to the number of rockets capable of being fired unpredictably 
towards local national airspace without prior warning, the weapon system has been 
designed technologically to respond with an automated setting. The missile defence 
system targets and engages belligerent rockets entering local airspace by predicting 
the population density of the region where the rocket is headed. The weapon 
system then decides whether or not to launch a precise guided interceptor to 
intercept an incoming rocket in the sky. If it computes that an active rocket 
interception within the protected region will be necessary, the weapon system 
responds with a Tamir interceptor that will detonate adjacent to these rockets in the 
sky to destroy them whilst in flight to minimise civilian casualties. However, the 
falling debris from the point of interception could be potentially lethal for the 
civilian population below. Rafael and mPrest’s online marketing material states 
that the target warhead is detonated over a neutral area to reduce the collateral 
damage done to the protected region.22 While the weapon system has an 
exceptionally high claimed rate of accuracy with best reported figures sitting at 
84% during Operation Pillar of Defence in 2012 and 91.3% during Operation 
Protective Edge23 in 2014, it does not provide 100% protection for its protected 
region. 
Classifying contemporary land-based missile defence systems as automated 
human-supervised weapon systems  
In the 2014 ICRC expert meeting report on autonomous weapon systems, it 
was stated that there was no internationally agreed definition of autonomous 
weapon systems at the time. For the purposes of that meeting, autonomous weapon 
systems were defined as weapons which independently select and attack targets 
with autonomy in their critical function of acquiring, tracking, selecting and 
attacking targets.24 The 2016 ICRC expert meeting report on autonomous weapon 
systems however established a working definition of autonomous weapon systems 
as being weapon systems with autonomy in their critical functions meaning that 
                                                          
21 Ibid 85. 
22 ‘Iron Dome Command and Control Centre’ mPrest (2011), available at 
mprest.com/images/pdfs/Air-defense-Iron_dome.pdf.  
23 Richemond-Barak & Feinberg op cit 525. 
24 ICRC Report on the ICRC Expert Meeting on Autonomous Weapon Systems: Technical, 
Military, Legal and Humanitarian Aspects, Geneva Meeting Highlights (2014) at 1.  
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they are designed to select and attack targets without human intervention.25 This 
meeting also categorised missile and rocket defence weapons, such as the Israeli 
Iron Dome and American THAAD weapon systems, as a particular category of 
autonomous weapon systems.26 Before delving into the design choices of a 
contemporary land-based missile defence system, it is necessary to set out the three 
broad categories of autonomous weapon systems as listed by Markus Wagner in 
his 2016 article on autonomous weapon systems. Thereafter it is also necessary to 
classify Iron Dome formally as an automated human-supervised weapon system by 
legal definition.  
Proving an automated nature  
Wagner utilised a modern clustered classification in 2016 when he outlined 
three categories of autonomous weapon systems. He explains that autonomous 
weapon systems are unmanned in nature and the three categories of autonomous 
weapon systems span from a high degree of human control to a lack of human 
control in operation. The three categories are accordingly remote-controlled, 
automated and autonomous.27 These categories cluster the previous categorisations 
of the US Department of Defence Directive 3000.09 of November 2012 – which is 
freely accessible online – as well as categorisations used by the ICRC in their 2014 
expert meeting report on autonomous weapon systems.  
Wagner’s categories differentiate between semi-autonomous (human 
targeting coupled with computerised engagement) and fully autonomous 
(computerised targeting coupled with computerised engagement) as a first sub-
categorisation. This is followed by the weapon system being either automated (the 
machine is unable to learn further or make dynamic discretionary decisions) or 
artificially intelligent (the machine is able to learn further and is able to make 
dynamic discretionary decisions) as a second sub-categorisation. According to 
Wagner’s clustered classification, a contemporary land-based missile defence 
system is an automated weapon system. It is a fully autonomous weapon system 
utilising machine targeting coupled with machine engagement, which is 
                                                          
25 ICRC Report on the ICRC Expert Meeting on Autonomous Weapon Systems: Implications of 
Increasing Autonomy in the Critical Functions of Weapons (2016) at 8.  
26 Ibid 10.  
27 Wagner, M ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems’ (2016) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 




furthermore automated in nature as the weapon system is unable to learn or make 
dynamic discretionary decisions.28 
The 2014 ICRC expert meeting report on autonomous weapon systems 
states that such automated weapons exist on the battlefield and they tend to be very 
constrained in the tasks they perform as they are defensive target vehicles or 
objects as opposed to humans and are deployed in simple, static and predictable 
environments.29 This report also emphasises that military capability advantage, 
necessity for autonomy, and reliability of communication links are the major 
factors for desiring autonomy in weapon systems. However, the report thereafter 
lists criteria to determine whether a level of autonomy will be acceptable in 
existing weapon systems. These criteria – many of which justify the level of 
autonomy of contemporary land-based missile defence systems – are: 
 a defensive task or an offensive task; 
 object targets or human targets;  
 kinetic or non-kinetic force;  
 a simple environment or a cluttered environment;  
 the ease of target discrimination in a particular context;  
 the degree of human interaction and oversight;  
 limited freedom to move in space or large freedom to move in space;  
 a small time frame of an attack or a long time frame of an attack; and  
 the predictability, reliability and trust in the weapon system.30  
Proving a human-supervised nature  
Schmitt states that Iron Dome is human-supervised in nature.31 This is 
echoed by Kenneth Anderson and Matthew Waxman who state that human 
supervisors can activate and override such a weapon system.32 A human-supervised 
weapon system is expressly defined in the US Department of Defence Directive 
3000.09 of 2012. This is defined as an autonomous weapon system, which is 
designed to provide human operators with the ability to intervene and terminate 
                                                          
28 Wagner op cit 6. 
29 ICRC (2014) op cit 1.  
30 Ibid 7. 
31 Schmitt, M ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: A Reply to 
the Critics’ (2013) (2) Harvard National Security Journal at 4.  
32 Anderson, K & Waxman, M Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon Systems: Why a Ban 
won’t Work and How the Laws of War Can (Hoover Institute, Stanford University 
2013) at 1.  
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engagements, including the event of a weapon system failure before unacceptable 
damages occur.33  
mPrest illustrates this setup as the command and control centre of a 
contemporary land-based missile defence system which allows for a battle-
situation picture officer, two interception officers, a commander as well as a 
system officer.34 This is in line with section 4(a)(2)(b) of US Department of 
Defence Directive 3000.09, which calls for prudent human interaction with the 
weapon system as well as section 4(a)(3)(a–c) of US Department of Defence 
Directive 3000.09, which calls for understandable feedback and instructions from 
the platform interface.  
Proving weapon system by definition  
The definitions listed in the 2009 HPCR Manual on International Law 
Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (HPCR Manual) can prove that a 
contemporary land-based missile defence system is a weapon system. Richemond-
Barak and Feinberg state that there is an absence of definition in terms of whether 
an automated missile defence system is indeed a weapon system. and this 
prevailing situation would leave the law governing the use and deployment of the 
weapon system to be dependent on context and interpretation.35 While the HPCR 
Manual does not constitute a binding source of law, its rules are seen to be of 
strong academic weight. The 2009 HPCR Manual however is an expert academic 
compilation and restatement of law applicable to air and missile warfare excluding 
issues of the jus ad bellum and recourse.36 It has been cited as being authoritative 
by multiple authors including Bruno Demeyere and Yoram Dinstein who not only 
co-ordinated and supervised the drafting of the HPCR Manual but also authored 
the Max Planck Institute’s encyclopaedia entries on missile warfare and air warfare 
respectively.  
In an air and missile context, a weapon system in its totality does indeed 
constitute a means of warfare per Rule 1(t) of the HPCR Manual, as ‘means of 
warfare’ is defined to mean weapons, weapon systems or platforms employed for 
the purposes of attack. The 2010 HPCR Manual Commentary elaborates on this 
point as a weapon system consists of one or more weapons with all related 
equipment, materials, services, means of delivery and means of deployment 
                                                          
33 US Department of Defence Directive 3000.09 Autonomy in Weapon Systems (2012) at 14. 
34 mPrest op cit.  
35 Ibid 499.  
36 HPCR Commentary on the HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and 
Missile Warfare (2010) at 5.  
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required for the self-sufficiency of the weapon system. Furthermore ‘means of 
warfare’ is explained by the HPCR Manual to be a broader concept than weapon, 
for it extends also to platforms and equipment that make an attack possible.37 
Outlining an existing international law framework for contemporary land-
based missile defence systems 
In October 2017, HRW argued for a ban on lethal fully autonomous 
weapon systems, which could closely resemble contemporary land-based missile 
defence systems set on automated mode (potentially lacking meaningful human 
control) causing collateral damage to civilians. In both potential instances, a 
machine would be deciding which humans would live and which humans would 
die. HRW inferred that new law could be created to regulate or ban these weapon 
systems. In a statement made to the United Nations General Assembly First 
Committee on Disarmament and International Security, HRW stated,  
The Group of Governmental Experts has been tasked with further exploring 
the issue and agreeing, if possible, on recommendations on options. 
Identifying such options at the CCW [Convention on Conventional 
Weapons] should be a swift exercise as there are only three real outcomes: 
1) a ban protocol, or 2) a protocol containing restrictions (regulation), or 3) 
no new protocol. Since 2013, 19 countries have endorsed the call to ban 
fully autonomous weapons, which is a goal shared by our Campaign to 
Stop Killer Robots. Dozens more have affirmed the importance of retaining 
meaningful or appropriate or adequate human control over critical combat 
functions. This level of interest in taking action shows there is likely a 
strong foundation of support for creating new international law.38 
Richemond-Barak and Feinberg argue that International Humanitarian Law 
does not address defence systems or the reflexive dilemmas that their deployment 
and use may create.39 However, Article 49 of Additional Protocol I could serve as 
the fundamental logical backdrop for active interceptions of a contemporary land-
based missile defence system. An ‘attack’ is defined therein as an act of violence 
against the adversary, which could be either offensive or defensive in nature. This 
provision expressly refers to offensive or defensive land, air and (or even) sea 
                                                          
37 HPCR (2010) op cit 55. 
38 HRW ‘Statement to the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and 
International Security’ (10 October 2017), available at 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/10/statement-un-general-assembly-first-
committee-disarmament-and-international-security.  
39 Richemond-Barak & Feinberg op cit 480–1. 
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attacks, which may affect the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian 
objects on land. According to Additional Protocol I Commentary, the word ‘attack’ 
is unrelated to aggression, and simply refers to the use of armed force to carry out a 
military operation at the start of or during armed conflict.40 The 2010 HPCR 
Manual Commentary furthermore asserts that the phrase ‘international armed 
conflict’ as expressly utilised in Additional Protocol I, does not only cover wars 
but also situations falling short of war irrespective of intensity and duration, such 
as a single cross-border rocket attack.41  
Two further fundamental legal premises for an active interception also 
exist. Rule 22(a) of the HPCR Manual clearly shows a rocket to be a legitimate 
military objective for interception by its very nature of being a weapon. 
Furthermore, Article 58(b) of Additional Protocol I is a provision, which requests 
that parties to a conflict avoid locating military objectives within or near densely 
populated areas. According to the 1987 ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocol 
I, this provision is open-ended as it does not affect a party’s freedom to organise its 
national defence to the best of its ability in the most effective way. In this regard, a 
party to a conflict cannot be expected to arrange its armed forces and installations 
in such a way as to make them conspicuous to the enemy.42 
In simple English, these provisions demonstrate an existing international 
law framework for contemporary land-based missile defence systems. These 
provisions prove that international law applies to defensive actions on land, which 
are not aggressive and which actually fall short of war – irrespective of intensity or 
duration – when targeting rockets, even when placed in a civilian environment 
Having established this existing international law premise, it is necessary to 
evaluate each design choice of contemporary land-based missile defence systems. 
A positive trend will be proved in the weapon system as it will be argued that as 
many as seven component design choices within the weapon system all honour a 
legal provision and make the military operation even more efficient.  
The first design choice  
The first design choice comprises a mobile unit with a limited geographical 
radius. This links to Article 40 of the Hague Rules of Air Warfare and enhances 
efficiency by eliminating illegal interceptions in neutral airspace and controversial 
interceptions in enemy airspace. Israel’s missile defence technology is staggered in 
                                                          
40 ICRC (1987) op cit 1882. 
41 HPCR (2010) op cit 39. 
42 ICRC (1987) op cit 2243–6. 
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three geographic levels, starting with Iron Dome for short-range attacks, David’s 
Sling (also known as ‘Magic Wand’) for longer-range attacks, and the third-
generation Arrow missile defence system, which is the world’s first nationwide 
missile defence system. Iron Dome is therefore a regional weapon system designed 
to intercept aerial threats of an unpredictable and asymmetric nature. The name 
‘Iron Dome’ is a loose English translation of the Hebrew name Kipat Barzel, which 
literally means ‘Iron Skullcap’. This name alludes to a defined and robust 
circumference of three-dimensional protection afforded by a contemporary land-
based missile defence system. In 2012, this name was paired with the Hebrew 
name Amud Anan literally meaning ‘Pillar of Cloud’ – a reference to biblical 
protection afforded to the Israelites during the Exodus (13:21). Accordingly, “The 
LORD went before them by day in a pillar of cloud to lead them the way and by 
night in a pillar of fire to give them light.” Iron Dome’s manufacturer, Rafael, 
expressly states that its weapon system is mobile yet produces a protective region 
of 70 km against rocket fire.43 As mentioned before, Shapir notes that the weapon 
system is regional in nature with a closed protective footprint of about 100 
kilometres squared.44 In his 2013 article on autonomous weapon systems, HPCR 
core expert Michael Schmitt generally refers to maximum range and human 
operator pre-programming as limiting features of autonomous weapon systems.45  
This limited geographical radius is important to note for a contemporary 
land-based missile defence system, as the initial issue that needs to be assessed 
when examining an active missile-to-rocket interception is the nature of airspace 
and its subsequent limits. Stephan Hobe explains that airspace is the space above 
the earth’s surface and the medium which facilitates international air and missile 
law. Airspace is essentially the medium through which missiles are launched and 
aircraft fly.46 While Hobe acknowledges that airspace is not entirely conclusive it is 
different to the concept of territory in Public International Law.47 Airspace is 
formally defined by Rule 1(a) of the HPCR Manual as the air up to the highest 
altitude at which an aircraft can fly and below the lowest possible perigee of an 
                                                          
43 Rafael Advanced Defence Systems ‘Iron Dome Defence against Short Range Rockets’ 
(2014), available at http://www.rafael.co.il/Marketing/186-1530-
en/Marketing.aspx?searchText=iron+dome.  
44 Shapir op cit 86. 
45 Schmitt op cit  13–4. 
46 Hobe, S ‘Airspace’ (2008) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law at 1. 
Available at http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e1138?rskey=W6qIIO&result=1&prd=EPIL  
47 Ibid 4. 
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earth satellite in orbit.48 This rule further acknowledges two airspace categories of 
national airspace and international airspace, which are not subject to the 
sovereignty of any state. It is necessary to examine the horizontal and vertical 
limits of national airspace to understand the need for a geographical restriction on 
the weapon system as well as the military efficiency which it creates. Hobe states 
that the horizontal limit of national airspace is set at national borders that surround 
state territory, territorial seas and archipelagic waters.49 According to Jan Wouters 
and Bruno Demeyere, the vertical limit of airspace is academically disputed;50 
however, Hobe states that it is generally agreed to exist at a point called the Von 
Karman line, which is situated at the edge of space 100 km above sea level.51 
Article 40 of the 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare is the legal provision, which is 
honoured by the geographical limit of a contemporary land-based missile defence 
system. This legal provision expressly prohibits belligerent military aircraft from 
entering the jurisdiction of a neutral state. However, upon a deeper look into the 
literature, Article 40 of the 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare was said by HPCR 
core expert Michael Bothe in 2011 to prohibit flight objects such as rockets and 
missiles from entering neutral airspace.52  
Demeyere analytically defines the three regular regions in which missile 
operations may take place, namely a belligerent’s own national airspace, the 
enemy’s national airspace and international airspace. Demeyere further states that 
missile transmissions through outer space (even over neutral states) are also valid 
as a fourth region due to a loophole in the wording of the 1967 Treaty of Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
Including The Moon and Celestial Bodies.53 Demeyere further emphasises the 
absolute inviolability of neutral state airspace for missile transmissions. Missile 
                                                          
48 Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University (2013), 
HPCR: Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
49 Ibid 2. 
50 Wouters, J & Demeyere, B ‘Overflight’ (2008) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law at 2. Available at 
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51 Hobe op cit  9–13. 
52 Bothe, M ‘Neutrality, Concept and General Rules’ (2011) Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law at 91. Available at 
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transmissions through neutral airspace are prohibited if they are launched from 
within a neutral state or even pass through neutral airspace for a short period of 
time.54 Missile transmissions through neutral airspace are also prohibited even if 
the military target is located outside the neutral state. This prohibition cannot be 
waived even if the neutral state consents to such an unlawful penetration of its 
airspace.55   
While a mobile geographical limit facilitates Article 40 of the Hague Rules 
of 1923, it also enhances military efficiency as air force commanders can control 
the interception circumference to affect early warning, evacuation and extra 
protective measures, such as bomb shelters, within the local state civilian 
population as per Article 57 of Additional Protocol I and Article 58 of Additional 
Protocol I avoiding controversial civilian casualties in enemy territory as well as 
illegal civilian casualties in neutral territory.  
The second design choice  
The second design choice is selective targeting. This links to Article 51 of 
the Charter of the United Nations, and enhances efficiency by saving ammunition. 
Rafael expressly states that the Iron Dome weapon system provides robust yet 
selective defence, meaning that a contemporary land-based missile defence system 
does not fire an interceptor to eliminate every single rocket entering its protected 
region.56 The Iron Dome has been programmed with the ability to predict when 
rockets will fall into populated areas, such as urban city centres, within its 
protected area versus rockets headed towards empty areas, such as the ocean or 
open fields.57 In 2013, Shapir discussed the number of ignored rocket threats faced 
by Iron Dome during Operation Pillar of Defence in 2012 noting that Iron Dome 
intentionally ignored 875 out of 1 506 rockets during this military operation.58  
In this regard, in 2011, Demeyere highlighted a proportional relationship 
between the distance a missile could be launched and the accuracy that a missile 
possesses versus its economic cost. He explained the economic reality that high-
end missiles remain out of reach of many states and it is these high costs that create 
asymmetries in an air and missile context.59 Shapir explains that a contemporary 
land-based missile defence system utilises incredibly expensive interceptors, which 
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may cost between 45 000 and 50 000 US dollars (USD) apiece. To compound the 
issue of high cost, Shapir acknowledges that on occasions, Iron Dome may need to 
launch two missiles in order to guarantee a successful rocket interception, which 
implies that the cost of one rocket interception may be close to 100 000 USD.60 
While Rafael markets the selective targeting feature Iron Dome proudly as being 
cost-effective, this weapon system design choice is seemingly necessitated by a 
legal provision as it honours Article 51 of the United Nations Charter in terms of 
individual self-defence.  
As a starting point to explain this relationship, Wagner expressly stated in 
2016 that the use of an autonomous weapon system does not render a military 
operation illegal as per the jus ad bellum and that an enquiry into a breach of the 
jus ad bellum is generally conceptually separate from the inquiry into the weapons 
used to attack.61 In 2014, Grimal stated that the mere stationing of a missile 
defence system does not violate the jus cogens norm of the prohibition of the use of 
force as per Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter implying that an active 
missile launch would indeed trigger a violation of this provision.62 This idea is re-
enforced by Oliver Dorr who stated in 2011 that the prohibition against the use of 
force is determined by what is meant by force, and that force can only be 
interpreted to mean a military force much like a missile launch.63 Therefore, whilst 
a conceptually separate enquiry exists between the jus ad bellum and jus in bello, 
on a case-by-case and unique basis, Rafael was seemingly legally obligated to 
programme a selective targeting feature to honour Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter on the occasion of every active interception.  
Christopher Greenwood explained in 2011 that there is a specific rule as 
per the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua Case according to 
which self-defence only warrants measures that are both proportional to the armed 
attack and necessary for response.64 Rocket attacks headed towards a populated 
area would necessitate a missile launch, which could be justified by the inherent 
right of a state to individual self-defence as per Article 51 of the United Nations 
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Charter if an armed attack was to occur against a member state of the United 
Nations. Alternatively, according to Alan Baker (2014), the 1837 Caroline Case 
established a customary international law right to self-defence in the face of 
necessity which is instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no 
moment of deliberation. This case was cited by Baker on the Max Planck Debate 
Map arguably to cut and paste this legal principle into the contemporary era of 
cross-border rocket attacks.65 
As to whether or not a rocket attack is an armed attack for purposes of 
justifying the military force of an Iron Dome missile launch, HPCR core expert 
Arne Willy Dahl stated in 2014 on the Max Planck Debate Map that the cross-
border launching of rockets, which carries explosive payloads is a clear example of 
an armed attack. Accordingly, if the rocket launch is an isolated or uncommon 
event then countermeasures may be taken as long as they remain within the realm 
of self-defence necessity and proportional counterforce.66 An armed attack can 
further be proved by definitions as Grimal stated in 2014, that an imminent missile 
launch would qualify as an armed attack67 and a missile can be proved to be a 
rocket by definition within the Commentary on the HPCR Manual.68 Accordingly, 
a rocket refers to any object which utilises a propellant to create thrust by expelling 
exhaust gas to move the object forward, and the term ‘rocket’ includes but is not 
limited to missiles.69  
The scale and effect of rocket attacks qualifying as an armed attack, as 
opposed to a mere frontier incident, when headed towards a civilian environment 
as per Karl Zemanek’s 2009 commentary on the Nicaragua Case,70 are also 
outlined in the 2015 Israeli Foreign Ministry Report on the 2014 Gaza Conflict. 
The Israeli Foreign Ministry cited long-term physical, social and psychological 
trauma to Israeli civilians71 while Shapir cited intensive economic loss from 
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standstills and stay-ins in every individual rocket attack.72 Selective targeting is 
therefore both a very important and an innovative technological design choice as it 
is not sufficient merely to build an automated missile launcher which targets and 
engages every single incoming aerial threat. Selective targeting is a design choice, 
which honours Article 51 of the United Nations Charter for self-defence in terms of 
necessity as well as the customary international law right to self-defence as stated 
in the Caroline Case of 1837. The saving of interceptors enacted through selective 
targeting further enhances military efficiency in terms of both monetary cost and 
increased air force resources. 
The third design choice  
The third design choice is a precise guided surface-to-air C-RAM 
interceptor. This links to the St Petersburg Declaration as well as Article 57 of 
Additional Protocol I and enhances efficiency by creating safer aerospace 
conditions for aircraft. Rafael expressly states that its interceptor missiles approach 
aerial targets such as rockets, artilleries and mortars in the sky. In doing so, radar is 
used to guide the missiles within passing distance of aerial targets for 
interceptions.73 In order to explain what is meant by a guided missile, it is first 
necessary to contextualise missiles within Public International Law.  
In assistance thereof, one must analyse the St Petersburg Declaration of 
1868. The St Petersburg Declaration bans bursting ammunition with a weight 
below 400 grams. However, against this set legal threshold, Bruno Demeyere 
expressly states that missiles weigh more than this and that missiles, such as 
bullets, also constitute bursting ammunition.74 For the purpose of contemporary 
military law, an interceptor could be viewed as an applied version of a bullet. 
Article 18 of the Hague Rules of Air Warfare further reinforces the use of missiles 
generally stating that the use of tracer, incendiary or explosive projectiles by or 
against air is not prohibited. Demeyere explains that until recently – unlike other 
weapons which are used in international armed conflicts – missiles had not even 
been defined in legal literature. Missiles were not defined in any treaty and 
therefore, according to Demeyere, it was not actually possible to view missiles 
from anything more than the point of view of military doctrine.75 Demeyere goes 
so far as to say that no treaty addresses missiles nor have states ever attempted to 
address missiles in a treaty. This however does not place missiles into a black hole 
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or vacuum as they are still weapons whose use must be regulated by and judged 
against the laws of war, especially the jus in bello.76 In 2009, Rule 1(z) of the 
HPCR Manual closed this gap with an expert manual-based definition for missiles, 
defining missiles as self-propelled unmanned weapons – launched from aircraft, 
warships or land-based launchers that are either guided or ballistic,77 forming a 
mutually exclusive classification.  
Demeyere outlines the main characteristic of ballistic missiles stating that 
these missiles rely solely on gravity once fired.78 The HPCR Manual explains the 
difference between a guided missile and a ballistic missile, stating that a guided 
missile is technologically designed with a built-in contingency or second-chance 
mechanism to divert the missile if civilians come between the missile and the 
legitimate military target.79 Demeyere however notes that there is no actual 
difference in legality between guided missiles and ballistic missiles and that no 
statement can be made generally that a guided missile will perform in a more legal 
manner than a ballistic missile. Accordingly, both types of missiles are 
fundamentally legal but both could be utilised in a legal or illegal manner.80 The 
HPCR Manual Commentary emphasises this point by stating that there is no 
express obligation in either treaty or customary law to utilise expensive precision-
guided weapons.81 Therefore, apart from being precise or imprecise in nature as 
well as being either guided or ballistic, the HPCR Manual Commentary further 
classifies missiles as being surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, air-to-surface or air-
to-air.82 
With regard to Article 57 of Additional Protocol I, the design choice of 
such an advanced guided and precise surface-to-air interceptor honours the 
principle of precaution.83 As both ballistic missiles and guided missiles are equally 
legal in nature, this is a design choice, which facilitates precaution as Rafael’s 
Tamir interceptors can be diverted if a non-enemy aircraft intervenes. Demeyere 
confirms this idea when he states that a guided missile launch would be terminated 
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by a man-in-the-loop overseeing guidance control if a civilian object intervenes84 
or, alternatively, such could even be done by a computer.85  
Guided interceptors are more expensive and technologically advanced 
when compared to ballistic interceptors. However, despite their cost and 
operational complexity, their very nature leads to a safer airspace environment by 
adopting a design which facilitates the principle of precaution. Military efficiency 
is enhanced by this design choice as air force commanders can control the airspace 
within the protected area of the contemporary land-based missile defence system 
far more safely by diverting or aborting any active situation in which a civilian 
aircraft intervenes between missile and rocket. This design choice is paired with 
specially designated civil aviation flight routes, which also facilitate the principle 
of precaution through Article 57 of Additional Protocol I.  
According to the Israeli Defence Forces, dangerous aerial situations are 
controlled by using advanced surveillance systems allowing for rocket 
interceptions moments after civilian aircraft had cleared these designated three-
dimensional routes.86 These advances ensure a far safer aerial environment than 
ballistic interceptors which, if fired inaccurately through either negligence or 
intent, cannot be diverted.  
The fourth design choice  
The fourth design choice is all-weather capability. This links to Article 
51(4)(b) of Additional Protocol I and enhances efficiency through increased 
opportunity for interceptions. Rafael claims that in developing Iron Dome, they 
have manufactured the world’s first day and night, all-weather missile defence 
system designed to function effectively in all weather conditions, including low 
clouds, rain, dust storms and fog.87 The Israeli Defence Forces took this concept to 
the Instagram social media platform as they publicly posted a photo of an Iron 
Dome battery claiming its continued full functionality in heavy snow conditions.88 
A contemporary land-based missile defence system can be deployed in adverse 
weather conditions without affecting its accuracy negatively and threatening 
civilian aircraft.  
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Article 51(4)(b) of Additional Protocol I is a generally phrased provision 
prohibiting indiscriminate attacks, which employ a method (or means) of combat, 
which is unable to be directed at a specific military objective. The simplest method 
of combat to conceptualise and which cannot be directed at a specific military 
objective is sabotaging a weapon directly in order for it to fire inaccurately. The 
important thing to keep in mind is that in simple conceptual scenarios, the illegal 
method of combat, which is unable to be directed at a specific military objective, is 
enacted prior to pulling the trigger. If one uses a weather-vulnerable missile 
defence system in adverse conditions then this is the applied equivalent of 
sabotaging a gun before the targeting and engaging of the enemy on the battlefield. 
This design choice of all-weather capability honours the legal provision of Article 
51(4)(b) of Additional Protocol I by eliminating the possibility of an indiscriminate 
attack by eliminating a method of combat that cannot be directed at a specific 
military objective. This design choice insulates the system from illegality and also 
quite logically enhances the military efficiency of the weapon system. This 
enhanced military efficiency is quite dramatic as a contemporary land-based 
missile defence system can be deployed accurately to protect a civilian population 
throughout the day, throughout the night and seemingly throughout even the most 
adverse weather conditions.   
The fifth, sixth and seventh design choices  
The fifth, sixth and seventh design choices, namely distinction sensors, 
proportionality algorithms and single-state production/deployment are unresolved 
in the literature. These design choices link to Article 48 of Additional Protocol I, 
Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I, and the requirements of the Nicaragua 
Case for collective self-defence. These design choices enhance efficiency by 
increasing the accuracy of target discrimination, reducing collateral damage in the 
protected region and eliminating delay for the initial interception. 
Rafael expressly states that they have installed sensors in the Iron Dome 
weapon system.89 These sensors are utilised much like human eyes to honour the 
principle of distinction as per Article 48 of Additional Protocol I, which obligates 
the parties to a conflict to distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives at all times and to 
direct their operations against military objectives only accordingly. Target 
discrimination between civilian aircraft and enemy militant rockets utilises colour-
blind sensors. HPCR core expert Schmitt stated in 2013 that sensors of this type 
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distinguish the shape, size and speed and material of an object.90 Distinction 
sensors are paired with proportionality algorithms, which make a calculation to 
intercept rockets over empty areas to honour Article 51(5)(b) of Additional 
Protocol I.91 This provision forbids an attack which may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life or injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated. These two design choices arguably also 
follow the overarching trend in the weapon system by honouring legal provisions 
and enhancing military efficiency. Target discrimination and interception decisions 
are made quickly and efficiently by the weapon system. Similar decisions cannot 
be made in time by a human on the ground under the pressure of a rapid rocket 
attack.  
The controversy, however, is whether the initial view of transitioning these 
human discretionary elements to a weapon system via coding is legitimate and in 
line with human cognitive function as per Wagner in 2014.92 Alternatively, the 
secondary view of human discretion and recourse being traceable back to human 
commanders, manufacturers and programmers as per the 2014 ICRC expert 
meeting report on autonomous weapon systems,93 the 2016 ICRC expert meeting 
report on autonomous weapon systems,94 Schmitt in 201395 and Rebecca Crootof 
in 2015, could be conceptually correct.96 Crootof, for example, expressly states that 
autonomous weapon systems are weapons (not commanders), which are capable of 
being used in compliance with the principle of proportionality. The latter view of 
discretion and legal recourse drawing back to humans is probably most likely, as 
Iron Dome was only built by Israeli companies as aforementioned, namely –  
 Rafael Advanced Defence Systems (based in Haifa), the main weapon 
system manufacturer;  
 Elta Systems (based in Ashdod), the radar manufacturer; and  
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 mPrest (based in Petach Tikva), the control and command system 
manufacturer.97  
Single-state build production is a curious design choice for contemporary 
land-based missile defence systems, which are technologically advanced. This 
design choice, however, most likely honours the timeous requirements of collective 
self-defence. According to the Nicaragua Case, these require a state not only to be 
entitled to individual self-defence but also to declare itself a victim of an armed 
attack and also to request assistance from a state for its assistance. In a case of 
collective security, it appears necessary to receive authorisation from the United 
Nations Security Council, which is an even more time-intensive requirement.98  
If the secondary outlook were to be followed, then discretion and recourse 
for the actions of the weapon system would draw back to the human commanders 
and human programmers linked to the rocket interception in question. Co-
producing or purchasing a contemporary land-based missile defence system would 
therefore mix the military operation of the missile-to-rocket interception, which 
would constitute a combined operation in the form of an ad hoc coalition in an air 
and missile context per Rule 160 of the HPCR Manual. The HPCR Manual 
Commentary importantly notes that even a mere degree of co-operation between 
forces is enough to constitute a combined operation.99  
These requirements for collective self-defence quite logically cannot be 
met by the time an initial rapid rocket attack or initial rocket barrage is identified in 
national airspace. This could seemingly create an inefficient and dangerous delay 
especially if the declaration is to be made to the international community and the 
request for assistance from another state is formal or timeous. Single-state 
production therefore also appears to be a design choice, which acknowledges the 
legal requirements for collective self-defence and makes the weapon system 
operationally most efficient. It therefore appears that a contemporary land-based 
missile defence system’s autonomous platform (the brains of the weapon system) 
ideally ought to be built without assistance from another state and it ideally should 
not be purchased from another state for active deployment.  
This collective self-defence dilemma may similarly hold true for the United 
States THAAD plan for South Korea. The THAAD weapon system is primarily 
built by the American company Lockheed Martin and is mentioned to function 
autonomously, much like Iron Dome in the 2016 ICRC expert meeting report on 
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autonomous weapon systems, as its interception is said to be totally autonomous.100 
This inefficiency may similarly hold true but to a far more dangerous and 
inefficient extent for the collective security missile defence plans of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for Spain, Romania and Poland using 
American-built Aegis warships101 unless such could be overcome by some sort of 
pre-authorisation agreement. A foreign platform paired with a local missile is in 
fact the converse of the current Iron Dome setup, as American company Raytheon 
won the contract to produce the Tamir interceptors for use with Israel’s locally 
built platform in September 2014.102 Raytheon further notes that the United States 
tested their Tamir interceptors in a local American platform in April 2016.103 This 
co-deployment problem underlines a call from the ICRC to reach out and 
participate with developing countries on the topic of autonomous weapon systems 
as the majority of countries have not voiced their opinions on this topic.104  
Concluding thoughts on contemporary land-based missile defence systems 
The modern-day concept of contemporary land-based missile defence 
systems is premised on an existing international law framework. Like the Iron 
Dome Missile defence system, such a weapon system would not only honour many 
existing legal provisions but would actually also operate most efficiently. Such a 
weapon system cannot be the subject of a pre-emptive ban, as seven legal design 
choices mitigate the one contentious design choice of automation. Autonomy as a 
concept is not yet catered for under public international law but is rather the subject 
of a 2012 United States policy directive to which it has been proved that this type 
of weapon system can comply. 
In September 2016, South African aerospace manufacturer Denel 
Dynamics unveiled plans for an anti-rocket and mortar air defence system to 
accompany the SANDF through Africa. These plans, which were unveiled at the 
Africa Aerospace and Defence expo, entailed the pairing of Rheinmetall’s 
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unmanned Swiss-built Skyshield platform with a Denel Dynamics South African 
built Cheetah interceptor missile. In February 2017, this plan appeared to 
materialise further through Rheinmetall’s presentation of its Skynex concept at 
IDEX 2017 in Abu Dhabi, which further illustrates the fact that these two 
companies wish to integrate the two components to construct an air defence 
weapon system. 
The seven design choices are crucial as guidance and all-weather capability 
would be of great operational importance for the Cheetah Skyshield plan if the 
SANDF intends to deploy such a weapon system within developing countries. 
Unsophisticated air traffic control and adverse weather conditions will accordingly 
be prevalent environmental and operational factors to be negotiated. The Cheetah 
Skyshield will seemingly be mobile (design choice 1), all-weather (design choice 
4) and will employ a guided missile (design choice 3). However there is still a gap 
of research knowledge as to whether this weapon system will utilise selective 
targeting (design choice 2). The Cheetah Skyshield should by all accounts utilise 
distinction sensors and proportionality algorithms (design choices 5 and 6) but it 
seems to lose some legality and efficiency with regard to single-state 
production/deployment – unless such can be rectified by some sort of pre-
authorisation (design choice 7). 
While the overarching trend theory presented does not grow the law per se 
– as an existing international law framework has been argued to have been utilised 
in an applied manner by Rafael – the positive trend in the weapon system may give 
a new spin to the economic school of thought in jurisprudence. Law as a tool for 
efficiency usually relates to commodity purchasing and economic transactions but 
in contemporary times, this seems to relate to a very smart and combat-proven 
rocket interceptor also.  
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